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The grammatical meaning of a statutory provision may not always gel with the 
purpose of the statute.  The court may strive to give the provision an interpretation at 
odds with its ordinary and natural meaning to meet the purpose of the legislation.  On 
occasion, this may involve notionally adding words to, or substituting words in, a 
statutory provision.  This process of “reading in” words demands that close attention 
be paid to the boundary between statutory construction and judicial legislation, 
particularly where a court is invited to carve out an exception from grammatically 
clear words.  In Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] AC 74, Lord Diplock 
identified three pre-conditions to reading words into a statute.  This article analyses 
the utility of those conditions within the context of the modern purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation and evaluates whether they remain sufficient guideposts for 
identifying the boundary between interpretation and legislation. 
 
Introduction 
Australian courts have consistently acknowledged the need for the interpretation of legislation 
to be limited to the task of statutory construction and not legislation.1  
“A court does not initiate legislation, nor does it formulate legislative policy. It is 
confined to the application of the statutory text, as enacted, to the case at hand and 
its declaration or exposition of the meaning of the statutory text occurs as an incident 
of that task. The legislative effect of such exposition of the statutory text as may be 
involved in the application of that text by a court to the case at hand is derivative and 
incidental.”2 
 
                                                
*   Barrister, Queensland Bar, Brisbane. 
**  Gadens Professor of Property Law, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology and 
Director, Commercial and Property Law Research Centre, QUT. 
 
1  See e.g. Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (No 3) (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423 per McHugh JA (as he 
then was); R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [5] per Spigelman CJ; Carr v State of Western 
Australia (2007) 232 CLR 138 at [10] per Gleeson CJ; Special Projects (Qld) Pty Ltd v Simmons 
[2012] QCA 205 at [25] per Fraser JA; Taylor v Centennial Newstan Pty Ltd (2009) 76 NSWLR 379 
at [89]-[91] per Basten JA; Meridien AB Pty Ltd & Anor v Jackson & Ors [2014] 1 Qd R 142 at [34] 
per Muir JA (McMurdo P and Atkinson J agreeing) (citing Newcastle City Council v GIO General 
Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85 at 109); Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [40] 
per French CJ and Crennan and Bell JJ (and in Taylor, Gageler and Keane JJ said (at [65]) 
"Construction is not speculation, and it is not repair.").  
2  Gageler S (now Gageler J of the High Court of Australia), “Common Law Statutes and Judicial 
Legislation:  Statutory Interpretation as a Common Law Process” (2011) 37 MULR 1 at 8. 
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The interpretative technique of reading words into a statutory provision is used by courts to 
give effect to the purpose or object of the legislation usually to avoid an irrational, absurd or 
capricious result.  This technique demands that close attention be paid to the dividing line 
between construction and legislation.  The risk of a court engaging in judicial legislation by the 
use of this technique is perhaps most acute in those cases where the court is invited to carve 
out an exception to the operation of the Act (by reading in words) notwithstanding the 
unambiguous language of a statutory provision.3 
More than 30 years ago, Lord Diplock, in Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] AC 74 
(“Wrotham Park”),4 identified three pre-conditions to a court reading words into a statute.  
Those pre-conditions (which we will refer to as “the Wrotham Park conditions”) are:  
1. the court must know the mischief with which the Act was dealing; 
2. the court must be satisfied that by inadvertence Parliament has overlooked an 
eventuality which must be dealt with if the purpose of the Act is to be achieved; and 
3. the court must be able to state with certainty what words Parliament would have used 
to overcome the omission if its attention had been drawn to the defect.  
His Lordship said that any attempt to “repair” an omission in an Act in the absence of satisfying 
the third condition “crosses the boundary” between construction and legislation; it becomes a 
usurpation of a function which is constitutionally vested in the legislature to the exclusion of the 
courts.5 
The test espoused (only) by Lord Diplock in Wrotham Park was endorsed by the House of 
Lords6 in Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (A Firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586 (“Inco 
Europe”).  The test has been applied in Australia,7  and recently arose for consideration by the 
High Court in Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 (“Taylor”).  The High 
                                                
3  This will be considered in the context of several case examples discussed below. 
4  Also referred to as Wentworth Securities Ltd v Jones. 
5  Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] AC 74 at 105-106. 
6  Although the third condition was reformulated. 
7  See, e.g., Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (No 3) (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423 per McHugh JA (as he 
then was); Saraswati v R (1991) 172 CLR 1 at 22 per McHugh J (Toohey J agreeing); Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [9] per French CJ and Bell J;  R v 
Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [9] per Spigelman CJ; Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys 
(2012) 296 ALR 96, [2012] VSCA 304 at [45] per Redlich and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA; 
Victorian WorkCover Authority v Vitoratos (2005) 12 VR 437 at [22]-[23] per Buchanan JA; Rail 
Corporation of New South Wales v Brown (2012) 82 NSWLR 318 at [45]-[47] per Bathurst CJ 
(Beazley and Basten JJA agreeing); McMahon v Permanent Custodians Ltd [2013] NSWCA 275 at 
[55]-[56] per Ward JA (Meagher and Barrett JJA agreeing); Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 
11564 (2013) 83 NSWLR 1 at [38] per McColl J (Hoeben J agreeing). 
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Court declined to consider the necessity for, or sufficiency of, the Wrotham Park conditions or 
whether there was an additional condition requiring that the words as modified must be 
“reasonably open” having regard to the statutory scheme.8  The applicability and adequacy of 
the Wrotham Park conditions remains a live issue.  
This article examines and analyses, through various case examples, the nature, scope and 
utility of the Wrotham Park conditions in the context of the modern purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation. The article also contrasts the alternative interpretive technique, 
apparent in some cases and justified as consistent with the purposive approach, which strains 
the meaning of the language of the legislation in a manner that does not purport to read words 
into the statute, but which also arrives at a meaning contrary to the ordinary grammatical 
meaning. 
Our thesis is that the technique of reading in words should be one of last resort and may be 
utilised only when the intractable grammatical meaning of a statutory provision defeats or is 
inconsistent with the purpose or object of the legislation.  Even then, courts must be alert to 
distinguish between those situations in which the inconsistency between grammatical meaning 
and purpose arises from a drafting error and those in which it results from a lacuna in the 
legislation which Parliament has failed to address.  The Wrotham Park conditions (with some 
further reformulation) provide assistance in identifying the dividing line between construction 
and legislation. 
The current approach to statutory interpretation  
It has been said that the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the 
meaning the legislature is taken to have intended them to have.9  
 
Statutory construction requires determining the legal meaning of the relevant provision by 
reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole and the context, the general 
purpose and policy of a provision and its consistency and fairness are considered surer guides 
to its meaning than the logic with which it is constructed.10  Context is used in its widest sense 
to include the existing state of the law and the mischief which one may discern the statute was 
                                                
8  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [39] per French CJ and Crennan and 
Bell JJ. 
9  Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [78] per McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. 
10  Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters Subscribing to Contract No IH00AAQS v Cross (2012) 248 CLR 378 
at [24] per French CJ and Hayne J, approved in Commissioner of Taxation v Unit Trend Services 
Pty Ltd (2013) 297 ALR 190, [2013] HCA 16 at [47] per French CJ and Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler 
and Keane JJ. 
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intending to remedy (ascertained from the Act itself and relevant extrinsic material).11  These 
notions encapsulate the purposive approach to statutory interpretation which has been 
enshrined in statute (both at State and Commonwealth level).  The statutory requirement to 
have regard to the purpose of an Act is expressed in two forms. 
Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides that, in interpreting a provision 
of an Act, the interpretation that would “best achieve” the purpose or object of the Act is to be 
preferred to each other interpretation.  A statutory provision in analogous terms is found in the 
jurisdictions of Queensland12 and the Australian Capital Territory.13  A different form of words is 
used in the Interpretation Acts of the other States and Territory,14  requiring a court to adopt a 
construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that 
purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) in preference to a construction that 
would not promote that purpose or object.  While the South Australian provision is qualified by 
the words “where a provision is reasonably open to more than one construction”, it appears 
that this qualification has not given rise to any different approach to the application of that 
provision.15 A distinction has been drawn between the operation of the two interpretative 
provisions suggesting the second form contemplates only a “limited choice between two 
constructions”, one that promotes the purpose and one which does not.16 
Ordinarily the legal meaning of a statutory provision will correspond with the grammatical 
meaning of the words used.17   However, on occasion the grammatical meaning may not gel 
with the purpose of the legislation as interpreted by the court.  In these circumstances, two 
primary approaches to interpretation are evident in the case law. 
In some cases, a court may strain the meaning of the words (without adding or substituting 
words) to reach a construction at odds with the ordinary grammatical  meaning,  but one 
                                                
11  CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408 per Brennan CJ and 
Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ. 
12  Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 14A(1). 
13  Interpretation Act 2001 (ACT), s 139. 
14  Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 33; Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic), s 35; Acts 
Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 22; Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 18; Acts Interpretation Act 1931 
(Tas), s 8A; Interpretation Act (NT), s 62A. 
15  Pearce DC and Geddes RS, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (7th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Australia 2011), p 42. 
16  Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573 at [46] per French CJ and Gummow, Hayne, 
Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ, citing Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249 at 262 per 
Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ.  Contrast Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship 
(2012) 199 FCR 404 at [63] where the Full Federal Court characterised the change to s 15AA as 
“purely stylistic”. 
17  Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [78] per McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. 
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considered to be consistent with the purpose of the legislation.  In other cases, as part of the 
interpretive process, the court will construe the provision by substituting words in, or adding 
words to, the provision to meet such purpose.   
In R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 (“Young”), Spigelman CJ considered that the 
contemporary approach to construction was well described as “literal in total context”.18  In the 
context of a consideration of the Wrotham Park conditions, Spigelman CJ said that, other than 
obvious typographical errors, a court supplies words “omitted” by the draftsperson only in the 
sense that “the words so included reflect in express, and therefore more readily observable, 
form, the true construction of the words actually used”.19  The court may construe words in a 
statute to apply to a particular situation or to operate in a particular way (even if the words 
used would not, on a literal construction, so apply or operate) if the words which actually 
appear in the statute are reasonably open to such a construction; construction must be “text 
based”.20  His Honour returned to this theme in R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 (“PLV”) where 
he said that it is not part of the function of a Judge to supply words believed to have been 
omitted by the legislature per se.21  
While this interpretative process can be given handles such as “reading down”, giving words 
an “ambulatory operation” or “implying” words into a provision, it is the writers’ view that the 
technique is essentially one which gives the language a strained construction consistent with 
the ascertained purpose, but contrary to the ordinary meaning of Parliament’s language.22  
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96; [2012] VSCA 304 (“Leys”), the 
Victorian Court of Appeal disagreed with the characterisation of the process described by 
Spigelman CJ as one of construction of the words actually used.23  The Court said that the 
process of construing the words actually used in their total context (literal in total context) was 
not well described and that while one could say that the context may reveal that a certain word 
                                                
18  R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [13]. 
19  R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [14]. 
20  R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [12] per Spigelman CJ.  See also Rail Corporation New 
South Wales v Brown (2012) 82 NSWLR 318 at [45] per Bathurst CJ (Beazley and Basten JJA 
agreeing). 
21   R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 at [81]. 
22  Cf Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (5th ed) at p 1324 where the author suggests that the term 
“reading down” is nothing but a “euphemism for strained construction”. 
23  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96, [2012] VSCA 304 at [92] per Redlich 
and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA. 
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should be read in a way in which it would not be read in isolation, it is another thing to say that 
the context can change the literal meaning of the word.24  The Court also said:25 
“This process [of reading in words] should not, in our respectful opinion, be described 
as construing ‘the words actually used’. It is precisely the deficiency of the words 
actually used that renders necessary, if the purpose of the Act is to be achieved, the 
process of identifying ‘the additional words that would have been inserted by the 
draftsman and approved by parliament had their attention been drawn to the 
omission before the Bill passed into law’ ... The task must always remain one of 
interpretation but it is interpretation that derives meaning from the statutory scheme. 
In this respect, the process of construction is not construction ‘of the words used’ but 
rather the process of determining whether the modified construction is reasonably 
open having regard to the statutory scheme, set against the background that Lord 
Diplock’s three conditions have been met.”  (footnotes omitted, underlining added) 
When considered in context, the reference to the “modified construction” is a reference to the 
re-framing of the language of the statue by the reading in of words (or substitution or omission 
of words).26  It is the modified construction which must satisfy the Wrotham Park conditions. 
On the facts of Leys, the Court adopted a construction which was contrary to the grammatical 
meaning of the language of the provision. The critical issue for consideration was whether s 37 
of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic),27 which had been inserted by operation of an amending Act, 
applied to the respondents’ offending conduct which occurred in February 2010.    At issue 
was the construction of the following transitional provision: 
“Section 37 as inserted by s 21 of the Sentencing Amendment (Correctional Form) Act 
applies to a sentence imposed on or after the commencement of that Act, irrespective 
of when the offence was committed when a finding of guilt was made.” 
 
On a literal construction of that provision, s 37 of the Sentencing Act applied to sentences for 
offences committed on or after the commencement of the whole amending Act, a date no later 
than 30 June 2013.28  The respondents contended, and the Court accepted (applying, inter 
alia, the Wrotham Park conditions), that the provision should be read as if the words “of s 21” 
were inserted after the word “commencement” with the result that s 37 of the Sentencing Act 
would be taken to apply to sentences imposed on or after 16 January 2012. 
                                                
24  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96, [2012] VSCA 304 at [93] per Redlich 
and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA. 
25  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96, [2012] VSCA 304 at [96] per Redlich 
and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA. 
26  In Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96, [2012] VSCA 304 the Court said that 
a construction that involves the “reading in” of words ought not be described as a “strained” 
construction: at [111] and footnote 183. 
27  Which section provided for the making of a community correctional order. 
28  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96; [2012] VSCA 304 at [17] per Redlich 
and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA. 
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In the writers’ view, the distinction between the two approaches is a fine one.  Nevertheless, 
while the outcome may be the same in a given case, the respective approaches may have 
subtle differences with the potential to impact on the outcome of subsequent decisions.  
Further, the adoption of the former approach, without giving consideration to the Wrotham 
Park conditions, may involve an inherent risk of diverting attention from the critical dividing line 
between interpretation and legislation.  The latter approach necessitates that the Wrotham 
Park conditions are squarely faced. 
Another issue in respect of which the Victoria Court of Appeal in Leys found itself at odds with 
Spigelman CJ was whether words can be introduced in a statutory provision so as to expand 
the sphere of operation of the provision. 
In PLV, Spigelman CJ said:29 
“The authorities which have expressed the process of construction in terms of 
‘introducing’ words to an Act or ‘adding’ words have all, so far as I have been able to 
determine, been concerned to confine the sphere of operation of a statute more 
narrowly than the full scope of the dictionary definition of the words would suggest. I 
am unaware of any authority in which a court has ‘introduced’ words to or ‘deleted’ 
words from an Act, with the effect of expanding the sphere of operation that could be 
given to the words actually used. This was the actual issue in R v Young. There are 
many cases in which words have been read down. I know of no case in which words 
have been read up.” (underlining added) 
 
 
In Leys, the Court said:30 
“We also respectfully disagree with the view of Spigelman CJ that words can only be 
introduced into a statutory provision where to do so will have the effect of reducing the 
scope of operation of the provision. As a matter of principle and authority words may 
be introduced which expand the operation of the provision. A survey of the authorities 
reveal that there have been occasions where a court has found it necessary to read 
the words used in a statutory provision as if they had an extended operation, in order 
for the statutory purpose to be achieved. Those authorities include ones relied on by 
McHugh JA in Kingston.” (footnotes omitted, underlining added) 
 
 
In reaching their conclusion, the Court analysed a number of cases which, it considered, 
evidenced the reading of words into a statutory provision as if they had an extended 
operation.31 
                                                
29  R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 at [88] per Spigelman CJ (Simpson J and Smart AJ agreeing). 
30  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96, [2012] VSCA 304 at [98] per Redlich 
and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA. 
31  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96, [2012] VSCA 304 at [98]-[104] per 
Redlich and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA. 
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 In Taylor, the majority of the High Court said that a purposive construction may allow the 
reading of a provision as if it contained additional words with the effect of expanding its field of 
operation (approving the observations of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Leys to that effect).32 
Before examining the application of these two interpretative approaches to cases where courts 
have been invited to interpret statutes by reading in words, each of the Wrotham Park 
conditions will be further explained. 
The Wrotham Park conditions 
The first condition  
The first condition requires the court to know the mischief with which the Act is dealing.  This is 
a consideration which would be part and parcel of the process engaged in to address the 
statutory command in the various Interpretation Acts namely, to consider the purpose or object 
of the legislation.  The purpose of the statute is ascertained from the text of the statute, the 
express objects of the legislation and any relevant extrinsic material.  This is a requirement 
that should be considered whether or not the court is invited to read words into the legislation. 
The second condition  
The second condition requires that the court must be satisfied that by inadvertence Parliament 
has overlooked an eventuality which must be dealt with if the purpose of the Act is to be 
achieved. 
In Tokyo Mart Pty Ltd V Campbell (1988) 15 NSWLR 275 (“Tokyo Mart”), it was said by 
Mahoney JA:33 
“Legislative inadvertence may consist, inter alia, of either of two things. The draftsman 
may have failed to consider what should be provided in respect of a particular matter 
and so fail to provide for it. In such a case, though it may be possible to conjecture 
what, had he adverted to it, he would have provided, the court may not, in my opinion, 
supply the deficiency. In the other case, the legislative inadvertence consists, not in a 
failure to address the problem and determine what should be done, but in the failure to 
provide in the instrument express words appropriate to give effect to it. In the second 
case, it may be possible for the court, in the process of construction, to remedy the 
omission.” 
 
 
                                                
32  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [37] per French CJ and Crennan and 
Bell JJ. 
33  Tokyo Mart Pty Ltd v Campbell (1988) 15 NSWLR 275 at 283 (McHugh and Clarke JJA agreeing). 
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These observations have been cited with approval at appellate level in the Full Federal 
Court,34 the Queensland Court of Appeal35 and the South Australian Court of Criminal 
Appeal.36 
Despite a suggestion that the precise nature of the distinction drawn by Mahoney JA was 
“obscure”,37 in the writers’ view there is a material distinction between the remedying of an 
omission where, upon a consideration of text and context, it is plain that Parliament has sought 
to address a matter which the language of the statute has failed to give effect to and, on the 
other hand, remedying a perceived omission in the legislation in relation to a matter which 
Parliament has overlooked (that is, failed to avert to) and which it would have addressed had 
the matter not been overlooked.  In the latter case, an attempt to fill the gap would trespass 
into the forbidden zone of judicial legislation. 
In the writers’ view, the House of Lords, in Inco Europe, confined the task of discharging its 
interpretative function by adding words, omitting words or substituting words, to cases of 
remedying patent errors in the drafting of the legislation.  Lord Nicholls made this clear by his 
Lordship’s references to “obvious drafting errors”,38 “plain cases of drafting mistakes”39 and 
“error in the Bill”.40 
This approach limits the scope for adding words to (or omitting words from) the language of a 
statute; it is only justified in cases of clear drafting mistakes.   The court must be satisfied that 
the drafter has “slipped up”.41  The writers consider that this consideration significantly reduces 
the scope for a court to read words into a statutory provision. 
 
 
                                                
34  VOAW v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 79 ALD 422, 
[2003] FCAFC 251 at [13] per Ryan, Lindgren and Sundberg JJ. 
35  Sevmere Pty Ltd v Cairns Regional Council [2010] 2 Qd R 276 at [56], [65] per Holmes JA. 
36  R v Di Maria (1996) 67 SASR 466 at 474 per Doyle CJ (Prior and Nyland JJ agreeing).  See also R 
v Byerley (2010) 107 SASR 517 at [108] footnote 18 per Kourakis J.  
37  Cardinal Project Services Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (2011) 81 NSWLR 716 at [36]-[37] per Basten 
JA. 
38  Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (A Firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586 at 592. This phrase was 
also adopted by Lord Clyde in R (Wardle) v Crown Court at Leeds [2002] 1 AC 754 at 789. 
39  Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (A Firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586 at 592. 
40  Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (A Firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586 at 592. 
41  Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (A Firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586 at 592 per Lord Nicholls.  
Despite this limitation, one writer has expressed the view that the rule against judicial legislation 
was “severely eroded” by the House of Lords in Inco Europe: Auchie D, “The Undignified Death of 
the Casus Omissus Rule”, (2004) 25 Statute Law Review 40 at 41. 
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The third condition  
The third of the Wrotham Park conditions is that the court must be able to state with certainty 
what words Parliament would have used to overcome the omission if its attention had been 
drawn to the defect. 
This third condition was framed in different terms by Lord Nicholls in Inco Europe. His 
Lordship said that the court must be sure of “the substance of the provision Parliament 
would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, 
had the error in the Bill been noticed”.42  It has been said that this form of words may 
perhaps indicate a relaxation of the requirements of the third condition as espoused by Lord 
Diplock in Wrotham Park.43  In Taylor, the majority seemingly approved the reformulation of 
the third condition by Lord Nicholls.44 
An additional condition?  
In Young, Spigelman CJ expressed the view that, in Wrotham Park, Lord Diplock did not say 
that whenever the three conditions are satisfied a court is at liberty to supply the omission of 
the legislature; rather, his Lordship was saying that in the absence of any one of the three 
conditions, the court cannot construe a statute with the effect that certain words appear in 
the statute.45  This raises the question of whether the three Wrotham Park conditions are 
sufficient.  
 
In Leys, the Court said that there is a “quite distinct” requirement46 in addition to the Wrotham 
Park conditions, namely that the words as modified must be “reasonably open” having regard 
to the statutory scheme.47  The Court said that it must be possible to “read in” or imply the 
additional words into the relevant statutory provision without giving to the provision an 
                                                
42  Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution (A Firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586 at 592. 
43  Ravenscroft v Nominal Defendant [2008] 2 Qd R 32 at [42]-[43] per Muir JA.  See also Beer t/as G 
& L Beer Covercreting v JM Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd [2008] 2 Qd R 199 at [27]-[28] per Muir 
JA (Holmes JA and Mackenzie AJA agreeing); Coxon B, “Open to Interpretation:  The Implication 
of Words into Statutes”, (2009) 30 Statute Law Review 1 at 27. 
44  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [39] and footnote 69 per French CJ 
and Crennan and Bell JJ. 
45  R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [11]. 
46  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96; [2012] VSCA 304 at [97] (and cited with 
approval in Victorian Workcover Authority v Elsdon [2013] VSCA 235 at [73] per Bongiorno JA and 
Dixon AJA). 
47  See the discussion of this so-called “fourth limb” in relation to earlier cases in Coxon B, “Open to 
Interpretation:  The Implication of Words into Statutes”, (2009) 30 Statute Law Review 1 at 21-32. 
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“unnatural, incongruous or unreasonable” construction and the provision as modified must 
produce a construction that is “in conformity with the statutory scheme”.48  
In the writers’ respectful view, the question of whether a construction is “reasonably open” is 
one that should be addressed as an anterior question to a consideration of the Wrotham 
Park conditions.  As part of the purposive approach to construction, a court may depart from 
the literal interpretation of a legislative provision when the operation of the statute on a literal 
reading does not conform to the legislative intent as ascertained from the provisions of the 
statute, including the policy which may be discerned from those provisions.49 
“… Generally speaking, mere inconvenience of result in itself is not a ground for 
departing from the natural and ordinary sense of the language read in its context.  But 
there are cases in which inconvenience of result or improbability of result assists the 
court in concluding that an alternative construction which is reasonably open is to be 
preferred to the literal meaning because the alternative interpretation more closely 
conforms to the legislative intent discernible from other provisions in the statute …”50 
(underlining added) 
 
It has also been said: 
“Inconvenience or improbability of result may assist the court to reach an available 
alternative construction reasonably open and more clearly conforming with the legislative 
intent otherwise discerned.” 51 
Therefore, a court has scope to adopt, in lieu of a literal interpretation of the text, an alternative 
construction which is “reasonably open”.    If the reference to “reasonably open” in Cooper 
Brookes is directed to an alternative construction that is reasonably open in a linguistic or 
grammatical sense, consideration of the Wrotham Park conditions need only arise where the 
language is intractable and there is only one available grammatical meaning.  In the case of 
intractable language, a question may arise as to whether words should be read in.  The writers 
consider that cases in which it may be necessary to read words into a statute are necessarily 
narrow in scope. 
The additional requirement referred to in Leys was reformulated by McColl JA in Taylor v 
Owners-Strata Plan No. 11564 [2013] NSWCA 55 as requiring the modification to be 
                                                
48  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96; [2012] VSCA 304 at [109] per Redlich 
and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA. 
49  Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1981) 147 CLR 
297 at 306 per Gibbs CJ. 
50  Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1981) 147 CLR 
297 at 320 per Mason J (as he then was) and Wilson J.  See also CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown 
Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384 at 408 per Brennan CJ and Dawson, Toohey and Gummow 
JJ; Monis v R (2013) 295 ALR 259; [2013] HCA 4 at [59] per French CJ. 
51  Braverus Maritime Inc v Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 68 at [36] per Tamberlin, 
Mansfield and Allsop JJ. 
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“consistent with the wording otherwise adopted by the draftsman”.52  In Taylor, the majority (of 
the High Court) said that it may not be sufficient that the modified construction is reasonably 
open having regard to the statutory scheme because “any modified meaning must be 
consistent with the language in fact used by the legislature”.53  The majority also approved the 
observation of Lord Justice Scarman in Western Bank Ltd v Schindler [1977] Ch 1 at 18 that 
the insertion must not be “too big or too much at variance with the language used by the 
legislature”.54  Scarman LJ’s statement does not provide guidance as to the circumstances in 
which the reading in of words would fall foul of that qualification. The writers respectfully 
consider that a requirement that the modified construction be consistent with the other 
language of the statute is a useful one.  However, in the writers’ view consider this factor 
should be addressed as a component of the third Wrotham Park condition rather than as a 
discrete condition. 
In the writers’ view, if there is any condition to be added to the Wrotham Park conditions, it is a 
requirement that words be “read in” only where the application of the only available meaning of 
a provision would result in an operation which defeats or is inconsistent with the purpose of the 
statute.  In some cases, such inconsistency may be demonstrated if the application of a 
provision according to its grammatical meaning would bring about an absurd (as distinct from 
an inconvenient) result; it would be rare that an absurd outcome would be consistent with the 
purpose of a provision.  In Wrotham Park, the passage outlining the Wrotham Park conditions 
was preceded by Lord Diplock’s reference to an application of the literal meaning that would 
“clearly defeat the purposes of the Act”.  This was the context in which his Lordship outlined 
the Wrotham Park conditions.  In Leys the Court said that a construction may depart from clear 
and unambiguous words if, inter alia, the purpose of Parliament is manifest and the error in 
drafting is plain and is “contrary to the legislative purpose”.55 
In the writers’ view, there is a fine, but material, distinction between adopting a modified 
construction (inconsistent with the literal or grammatical meaning) which avoids a clash 
between the literal meaning and the achievement of the evident purpose of the Act (or 
provision) and, on the other hand, adopting a modified construction which is generally 
                                                
52  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 (2013) 83 NSWLR 1 at [40] per McColl J (Hoeben J 
agreeing) citing Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96; [2012] VSCA 304 at 
[97] and Mills v Meeking (1990) 169 CLR 214 at 235 per Dawson J. 
53  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [39] per French CJ and Crennan and 
Bell JJ. 
54  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [38] per French CJ and Crennan and 
Bell JJ. 
55  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96, [2012] VSCA 304 at [110] per Redlich 
and Tate JJA and T Forrest AJA. 
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consistent with the purpose of the Act (but which is unnecessary to avoid the purpose of the 
legislation being defeated).  It is in the former case only that the Court may read in words to 
provide the alternative construction.  If the purpose of the statute is not thwarted by a literal 
interpretation of the text of the statute (or an alternative grammatical construction which is 
reasonably open), the reading in of words to give a provision a contrary meaning to the 
grammatical language of the statute runs the risk of transgressing the rule against judicial 
legislation.  This requirement can be conveniently treated as a reframing, or qualification, of 
the first of the Wrotham Park conditions. 
Adding, substituting or changing words - case examples 
Given the subtle difference between the two interpretive approaches discussed above, there is 
utility in examining the different approaches and the role of the Wrotham Park conditions in the 
context of actual, rather than abstract, situations. This part of the article critiques the 
interpretative approaches in several significant decisions preceding the High Court’s decision 
in Taylor.   
Substitution of words 
In this category of case, a word in a statutory provision is substituted for another word so as to 
give the provision a meaning inconsistent with its grammatical meaning. The High Court’s 
decision in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 (“SZJGV”) 
provides an interesting context for consideration of the two interpretative approaches outlined 
above.  The High Court considered whether a provision of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) should 
be construed in a manner which diverged from its literal interpretation.  The critical question 
was whether, on its proper construction, s 91R(3) of the Migration Act required the decision 
maker to disregard a person’s engagement in conduct for the purpose of making their case for 
refugee status stronger (and the reasons for it) for all purposes in connection with the 
determination of an application for a protection visa.  Section 91R(3) provided: 
“For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular 
person: 
 
(a) in determining whether the person has a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in Article 1A(2) of the 
Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol; 
 
disregard any conduct engaged in by the person in Australia unless: 
 
(b) the person satisfies the Minister that the person engaged in the conduct 
otherwise than for the purpose of strengthening the person’s claim to be a 
refugee within the meaning of the Refugees Convention as amended by the 
Refugees Protocol.”  
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The Court, by a 4-1 majority, concluded that s 91R(3) did not prohibit a decision maker, 
making the determination contemplated in subsection (a), from drawing inferences adverse to 
a visa applicant based on the applicant’s conduct within Australia unless the conditions 
referred to in subsection (b) were satisfied. 
In a joint judgment, French CJ and Bell J referred to the Wrotham Park conditions (as 
explained by Lord Nicholls in Inco Europe), and the principle that a failure to satisfy such 
conditions would “cross the boundary between construction and legislation”.56  Their Honours 
were prepared to read the word “whether” as “that” on the basis that the substituted text 
corrected what would be an obvious drafting error (if “whether” were to be construed according 
to its ordinary and natural meaning).57  Their Honours considered that such a construction not 
only met the purpose of the subsection but avoided “absurd results”58 and that an alternative 
construction would be “irrational”.59   
Hayne J (in dissent) rejected a construction that the word “whether” should be read as “that”.60  
Hayne J considered that the language of s 91R(3) was “intractable”.61  His Honour could not 
be satisfied that the drafter of the provision had made a mistake or that to read the subsection 
literally would produce an operation of the Act that warranted the description “capricious” or 
“irrational”.62  His Honour concluded that it was an “altogether too large a step” to suggest that 
the idiomatic distinction in use between “whether” and “that” supported the view that the drafter 
of s 91R(3), “through ignorance or mistake”, used “whether” in the command provided by s 
91R(3) when “that” was intended.”63  Although Hayne J did not refer to Wrotham Park or Inco 
Europe, his Honour’s observations suggest that there was a need to demonstrate a drafting 
error (through ignorance or mistake) to justify substituting “that” for “whether”. 
The reasoning of the other Judges forming the majority, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, exemplifies 
the alternative approach to adopting a purposive construction. Their Honours considered, in 
detail, the history of s 91R(3) including the relevant extrinsic material and stated:64 
“It seems unlikely to have been intended that a decision-maker undertake the inquiry 
about the person’s motive dictated by subs (3), reach a conclusion and then be 
                                                
56  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [9]. 
57  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [12]. 
58  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [12]. 
59  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [9]. 
60  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [24]. 
61  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [21]. 
62  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [23]. 
63  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [24]. 
64  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [62]. 
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required to put it out of his or her mind. The result would be to deny the decision-
maker evidence or findings which might be influential to the assessment which is at the 
centre of his or her statutory task. Applying the section in this way would permit a 
person to overcome difficulties created by the person’s deliberate engagement in the 
conduct, the motive for which is an issue raised by subs (3) itself. It would defeat the 
object of subs (3) which is to prevent claimants from gaining an advantage from 
conduct undertaken in Australia. The result of such a construction would be both 
inconvenient and improbable. This may suggest that an alternative to a literal 
approach, one which more closely conforms to the legislative intent, is preferable.” 
(footnote omitted, underlining added) 
 
 
Their Honours observed that, in this particular case, the object of s 91R(3) required that the 
section be read more narrowly than might be achieved by a literal approach.65 
In the writers’ view, the following approaches can be discerned from the judgments: 
(a) French CJ and Bell J concluded that the language was intractable (but found that the 
literal or natural and ordinary meaning of the text gave rise to an absurd result and, 
further, that the substituted text corrected what would be an “obvious drafting error”); 
(b) Hayne J also considered that the language was intractable but found no occasion to 
“recast” the language because a literal interpretation would not produce an operation of 
the Act that warranted the description “absurd”, “capricious” or “irrational”; 
(c) Crennan and Kiefel observed that, of the competing constructions, one would be “both 
inconvenient and improbable” and that, applying a purposive test, the section should 
be read more narrowly.66  This approach suggests that their Honours concluded that 
they were not faced with language which was intractable and that there was no need to 
recast the provision.   
The difference between interpreting existing words within a statutory provision as if a different 
word was substituted and giving effect to an interpretation of the provision as having a 
particular meaning consistent with the purpose is a subtle one in the context of outcome but 
may be significant in terms of drawing a line between interpreting and rewriting legislation.  
 
 
 
                                                
65  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [65]. 
66  Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJGV (2009) 238 CLR 642 at [65]. 
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Addition of words 
The second type of case is where courts have considered whether a statutory provision 
should be read as if words were added to the provision.67  In the writers’ view, a proper 
utilisation of the Wrotham Park conditions means that only in the case of a drafting error 
leading to an interpretation that defeats or is inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation 
should words be added by a court.  For example, in R (Confederation of Passenger 
Transport UK) v Humber Bridge Board [2004] QB 310 (“Humber Bridge”) the Court was 
prepared to read into the schedule of a statutory instrument (being a Toll Revision Order 
made in 1997 (“the Order”)) a reference to a “large bus” when those words did not appear in 
the Schedule.  The Order adopted certain definitions including those of “bus”, “small bus” 
and “large bus”.  Paragraph 2 of the schedule provided for a number of classes of traffic and 
maximum tolls yet despite providing a definition of “bus” and “large bus”, no reference was 
made to a toll in respect of a large bus.  Clarke LJ68 considered that without adding a 
reference to large buses in the schedule (in respect of which a toll would apply), the Order 
would be “productive of absurdity”.69  The Court was satisfied that the reference to a large 
bus was omitted as a result of a mistake by the draftsperson.  
The decision of the High Court in Taylor demonstrates the importance of limiting the addition 
of words to relevant drafting errors rather than adding words merely to fill a gap disclosed in 
the legislation.  The High Court was required to determine whether s 12(2) of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (“the CLA”) placed a limitation on an award of damages for the loss 
of expectation of financial support under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) 
(“the Relatives Act”).70  A majority of the High Court (French CJ and Crennan and Bell JJ) 
found that s 12(2) of the CLA placed no limitation on such an award of damages.  A minority 
(Gageler and Keane JJ) reached the contrary conclusion.  
The appellant was the widow of Mr Taylor who was killed when an awning outside a shop 
collapsed on him. The appellant commenced proceedings under ss 3 and 4 of the Relatives 
Act to benefit herself and her children. Section 12 of the CLA provided, inter alia: 
“ (1) This section applies to an award of damages: 
(a) for past economic loss due to loss of earnings or the deprivation or 
impairment of earning capacity, or 
                                                
67  Director of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96; [2012] VSCA 304 is an example of 
adding words to the intractable language of a statutory provision. 
68  With whom Auld and Jonathan Parker LJJ agreed. 
69  R (Confederation of Passenger Transport UK) v Humber Bridge Board [2004] QB 310 at 325. 
70  A form of Lord Campbell’s Act fatal accidents legislation.   
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(b) for future economic loss due to the deprivation or impairment of earning 
capacity, or 
 
(c) for the loss of expectation of financial support. 
 
(2) In the case of any such award, the court is to disregard the amount (if any) by 
which the claimant’s gross weekly earnings would (but for the injury or death) 
have exceeded an amount that is 3 times the amount of average weekly 
earnings at the date of the award. (underlining added) 
 
...” 
The learned primary judge, in answering a preliminary question, concluded that insofar as a 
claim included damages for loss of expectation of financial support provided by the late Mr 
Taylor, the claim was to be determined by disregarding the amount (if any) by which Mr 
Taylor’s gross weekly earnings would (but for his death) have exceeded an amount that is 
three times the amount of average weekly earnings at the date of the award.  
That view was upheld by a majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.71  The majority 
applied the Wrotham Park conditions and construed s 12(2) as if it contained the additional 
words “or deceased person’s” after the word “claimant’s”.72  
In the High Court, the majority allowed an appeal against the Court of Appeal’s majority 
judgment.  In rejecting the primary Judge’s construction, the majority said:73 
“… On no view can the deceased be ‘the claimant’. To read s 12, in the case of an 
award under s 12(1)(c), as applying the s 12(2) limitation to the deceased's gross 
weekly earnings cannot be reconciled with the language that the Parliament has 
enacted. The phrase ‘the claimant's gross weekly earnings’ is incapable of identifying 
the gross weekly earnings of the deceased.” 
  
The majority confirmed that the task for the Court was one of construction and not judicial 
legislation.74   While the majority considered it unnecessary to decide whether the Wrotham 
Park conditions were always, or even usually, necessary and sufficient,75 their Honours 
expressed the view that whether a court is justified in reading a statutory provision as if it 
contained additional words or omitted words involves “a judgment of matters of degree”.76  
Such a judgment is readily answered in favour of addition or omission in the case of simple, 
                                                
71  McColl and Hoeben JJA (Basten JA dissenting). 
72  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 (2013) 83 NSWLR 1 at [34], [43] per McColl J 
(Hoeben J agreeing). 
73  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [41]. 
74  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [40]. 
75  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [39]. 
76  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [38]. 
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grammatical, drafting errors which if uncorrected would “defeat the object of the provision”; 
however, it is answered negatively for a construction that fills "gaps disclosed in legislation" 
or makes an insertion which is "too big, or too much at variance with the language in fact 
used by the legislature".77   The majority concluded that the purpose of s 12 may be 
identified as a limitation of the component of the award that is assessed by reference to a 
claimant’s high earnings in claims for personal injury damages brought by or on behalf of 
high-earning individuals.78 
While the minority (Gageler and Keane JJ) agreed with the conclusion reached by the Court 
of Appeal, their reasons for dismissing the appeal differed from those below. The minority 
approached the question of construction without regard to the Wrotham Park conditions. 
Their Honours said that context sometimes favoured an “ungrammatical legal meaning” 
which in turn sometimes involved reading statutory text as containing “implicit words” and 
that implicit words are sometimes words of limitation and sometimes words of extension, but 
they are always “words of explanation”.79  Their Honours said:80 
“Context more often reveals statutory text to be capable of a range of potential 
meanings, some of which may be less immediately obvious or more awkward than 
others, but none of which is wholly ungrammatical or unnatural. The choice between 
alternative meanings then turns less on linguistic fit than on evaluation of the relative 
coherence of the alternatives with identified statutory objects or policies.” 
 
In the end result, the minority construed the reference to the “claimant’s gross weekly 
earnings” in s 12(2) as a reference to the gross weekly earnings upon which the claimant 
relies in the claim for damages.81  In other words, it was a reference to the claimant’s 
earnings or the injured or deceased party’s earnings upon which the claim was founded. 
Consequently, the limitation in s 12(2) applied to the claim. 
In the writers’ view, the competing conclusions of the majority and minority can be distilled 
into the following approaches. The majority appeared to accept that the phrase “the 
claimant’s gross weekly earnings” in s 12(2) was intractable82  and there was no basis for 
reading it otherwise because s 12(1)(c) and s 12(2) could operate harmoniously.83  In 
contrast, the minority necessarily concluded that the phrase “the claimant’s gross weekly 
                                                
77  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [38] citing Marshall v Watson (1972) 
124 CLR 640 at 649 per Stephen J and Western Bank Ltd v Schindler [1977] Ch 1 at 18 per 
Scarman LJ. 
78  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [44]. 
79  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [65]. 
80  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [66]. 
81  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [70]. 
82  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [41]. 
83  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [42]. 
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earnings” could be construed in a way which was not “wholly ungrammatical or unnatural”. 
They concluded that the “gross weekly earnings” are those which a “claimant” (who may be 
one of the relatives of the deceased for whose benefit the action is brought) relies on in the 
claim for damages that is subject of an award of damages.  In the writers’ view, the 
minority’s approach could be seen as an example of Spigelman CJ’s “literal in total context” 
approach.  The minority eschewed the reading in of words as the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal had done, but interpreted s 12 in a manner which differed only slightly from that of 
the Court of Appeal and achieved the same ultimate result.  
The potential to read in words also arises where a court is invited to carve out an exception 
from the otherwise clear words of a legislative provision. 
Creating statutory exceptions by reading in words 
While the construing of words in a manner which creates an exception to the application of a 
statutory provision according to its grammatical meaning could be termed a “reading down” of 
the words of the statute, the writers consider that such a phrase does not adequately capture 
the true effect of an interpretation that creates, in effect, a statutory exception.  
As will be seen, the differing interpretive approaches discussed above are also reflected in 
cases in which it has been argued that the provision in question does not apply in a particular 
category of case notwithstanding that the grammatical meaning of the statute would require 
the provision to so apply.  In the writers’ view, the interpretation of a statutory provision which 
effectively creates an exception to the otherwise clear meaning of the provision treads a razor 
thin line between construction and legislation.  The writers consider that a court should 
consider whether the absence of an exception would lead to an interpretation which defeats or 
is inconsistent with the purpose of the legislation.  A conclusion to that effect may be 
buttressed by the existence of extrinsic material which makes it pellucidly clear that Parliament 
intended to create such an exception or a conclusion that other provisions of the statute would 
be rendered practically unworkable if an exception did not exist.  In these “exception” cases, 
application of the Wrotham Park conditions (as reformulated) may prevent a court from falling 
across the thin dividing line. 
De Marco 
De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 (“De Marco”), 
demonstrates that difficult interpretative questions may arise where a party seeks to take 
advantage of a statutory right notwithstanding some default on his or her part.   
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The appellants (who were land owners) objected to a land tax assessment under the Land Tax 
Management Act 1956 (NSW).  They claimed an entitlement to the “principal place of 
residence” exemption.  The exemption operated if the person was the owner of land “that has 
been used and occupied by the person as his or her principal place of residence for a 
continuous period of at least six months”.  The appellants had lived on the land in question in a 
mobile home and then a caravan for a continuous period of at least six months.  The Local 
Government Act 1993 (NSW) allowed a person to install a movable dwelling on land only with 
prior approval from the relevant Council.  The appellants had not received such approval.  The 
New South Wales Court of Appeal, by a 2-1 majority, rejected the Chief Commissioner’s 
argument that the exemption operated only in circumstances where the use and occupation of 
the land was “lawful” (and that the appellant’s occupation was not lawful).   
McColl JA, in dissent, accepted the Chief Commissioner’s argument.  After a detailed 
consideration of the application of the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua 
propria (no man can take advantage of his own wrong)84 in relation to statutes, her Honour 
concluded that a literal reading of the exemption which was “indifferent” to whether or not the 
use and occupation was “lawful” would not be a construction the Court should attribute to the 
legislature.85  Her Honour inferred that the legislation was enacted on the presumption that the 
Court would apply the maxim and permit owners of land to take advantage of the statutory 
benefit the exemption afforded only if the qualifying conditions are performed “in a lawful 
manner”.86  
In contrast to McColl JA, Basten JA concluded that the legislative scheme did not call for, and 
did not permit, the introduction of an additional constraint that the use and occupation must be 
lawful, at least in circumstances where the use and occupation was permissible with 
consent.87  His Honour acknowledged that determining whether a condition which does not 
appear in a statute may be implied requires a resolution of conflicting principles, on the one 
hand adopting a practical and sensible approach to effecting a clear legislative purpose which 
has not been fully expressed and on the other hand involving the court purporting to legislate 
and “exceeding the bounds of judicial power”.88  His Honour then referred to the Wrotham Park 
conditions and said first, that it was difficult to be satisfied that the word “lawful” had been 
                                                
84  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [33], [34], [39], [40], [41]. 
See also Thompson v Groote Eylandt Mining (2003) 173 FLR 72; [2003] NTCA 05 at [31] per 
Mildren J (with whom Martin CJ and Thomas J agreed); Holden v Nuttal (1945) VLR 171 at 178 
per Herring CJ. 
85  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [60]. 
86  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [60]. 
87  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [79]. 
88  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [74]. 
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inadvertently omitted and, secondly, that it was far from clear that the purpose of the statute 
required the insertion of the qualifier “lawful” before use and occupation.89  Basten JA also 
noted the maxim referred to above but observed that the maxim is stated with a level of 
generality.90  His Honour observed that the concept of “wrongdoing” covered by the maxim 
covered a “wide expanse of conduct”91 and observed that the only possible conduct which 
might be thought to warrant a reading down of the exemption would be that deliberate use of 
land for residential purposes either knowing that such use was prohibited or knowing that 
permission for such use was necessary and had not been obtained.  However, his Honour 
considered that without more, such conduct would have “no clear policy connection with the 
exemption from land tax”.92 
Gzell J was also of the view that the exemption did not require a consideration of lawfulness or 
unlawfulness.  His Honour’s conclusion was based on the following: 
(a) that the implication of the word “lawful” (or the words “not unlawful”) would create some 
“awkwardness of expression” in another provision of the legislation and would tend to 
defeat the purpose of a further provision of the legislation;93 
(b) the inclusion of such a qualification would burden the Chief Commissioner with the task 
of determining whether the use and occupation of the land was lawful or not when that 
was the function of Councils of areas within New South Wales.94 
Gzell J founded his conclusion on the inconsistency with the language of the statute which 
would otherwise arise and the potentially capricious consequences of importing the notion of 
unlawfulness.  While his Honour did not refer to the Wrotham Park conditions, the 
considerations identified by him would also indicate that the second and third conditions would 
not be satisfied if applied. 
De Marco demonstrates that the potential application of an established interpretative maxim 
does not justify ignoring the factors identified by the Wrotham Park conditions (which draw 
attention to the relevant question of whether the absence of an exception is attributable to 
drafting error or to an omission that Parliament failed to consider). 
 
                                                
89  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [75]. 
90  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [76]. 
91  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [77]. 
92  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [77]. 
93  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [158], [159]. 
94  De Marco v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWCA 86 at [127] and [152]. 
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Meridien 
A case in which a provision was construed as if it did contain an exception in the case of 
default is Meridien AB Pty Ltd v Jackson [2014] 1 Qd R 142 (“Meridien”).  While the Court 
justified the exception by reference to the Wrotham Park conditions, the interpretive 
presumption that Parliament did not intend a buyer to take advantage of his or her own breach 
appears to have strongly influenced the conclusion.  The Queensland Court of Appeal 
overturned a decision that a purchaser under an “off the plan” contract had validly terminated 
the contract pursuant to s 27 of the Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld) as it then stood, by reason of 
the failure of the vendor to give the purchaser a registrable instrument of transfer for the lot 
within 3½ years after the date the contract was entered into.  
Section 27 then provided: 
“(1) This section applies if— 
 
(a) a purchaser entered upon the purchase of a proposed lot under an 
instrument relating to the sale of the proposed lot (the instrument); and 
 
(b) the vendor has not given the purchaser a registrable instrument of transfer 
for the lot within 3½ years after the day the instrument was made. 
 
(2) The purchaser may avoid the instrument by written notice given to the vendor 
before the vendor gives the purchaser the registrable instrument of transfer for 
the proposed lot.” 
 
 
In that case, the vendor had been prepared to forward the instrument of transfer upon the 
purchaser’s undertaking to use the transfer documents for stamping purposes only prior to 
settlement and, further, the vendor was ready, willing and able to attend the settlement to 
tender.  The purchaser had refused to settle the contract on the date for settlement alleging 
misleading or deceptive conduct on the part of the vendor.  The vendor sought specific 
performance of the contract.  Prior to determination of the vendor’s claim, the period of 3½ 
years allowed under the Land Sales Act expired and the purchaser purported to terminate the 
contract in reliance on s 27 of the Act.  The Court of Appeal concluded that the purchaser had 
no right to terminate the contract under s 27. 
Muir JA (who wrote the leading judgment) said:95 
“In my view it is implicit in subsections (1) and (2) of s 27 that the ‘purchaser’ referred 
to is one which, at the time of giving notice under s 27(2), was not wrongfully failing 
or refusing to perform those of its obligations under the contract which were 
                                                
95  Meridien AB Pty Ltd v Jackson [2014] 1 Qd R 142 at [32] (McMurdo P and Atkinson J agreeing). 
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concurrent with and dependent upon the obligations of the vendor to provide it with a 
registrable instrument of transfer. The section does not contemplate the conferring of 
a right of avoidance on a purchaser which would have been provided with a 
registrable instrument of transfer on settlement under the contract were it not for its 
own contractual default.” 
 
While Muir JA referred96 to the reasons of McHugh J in Newcastle City Council v GIO General 
Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85, which reasons included a reference  to Wrotham Park, the rationale 
for the decision appeared to be influenced by his Honour’s view that it was unlikely that the 
provision was intended to operate so as to permit a purchaser that refused to settle in breach 
of its contractual obligations (frustrating the vendor’s attempts to settle in compliance with its 
contractual obligations) to escape from the contract and avoid liability.97  In the writers’ view, 
this approach has some parallels with the approach preferred by McColl JA (in dissent) in De 
Marco. 
However, the meaning of the term “purchaser” in s 27(1)(a) was intractable; it could only mean 
a person who enters upon the purchase of a proposed lot.  The term “purchaser” also appears 
in ss 27(1)(b) and 27(2).  There is nothing in the language or structure of subsection 27(2) (or 
elsewhere in the Land Sales Act) that suggests that a “purchaser” in subsections 27(1)(b) and 
(2) is a purchaser who, at the time of giving notice under subsection 27(2), was not wrongfully 
failing to perform his or her obligations under the contract.  The critical question of whether 
there was relevant “inadvertence” was not directly addressed.  It is an interesting feature of the 
case that between the date of the primary decision and the date of the appeal, the Queensland 
Parliament introduced legislation amending s 27(2) to limit the entitlement to terminate where 
there was a failure to give the instrument of transfer “other than as a result of the purchaser’s 
default”. 
In the writers’ view, the same outcome could have been reached by the Court without resort to 
grafting an exception on to s 27(2).  Rather, the word “given” in s 27(1)(b) could have been 
attributed a more expansive meaning than its primary meaning (namely, the physical handing 
over of the transfer document).  One of the meanings of “give” in the Macquarie Dictionary is 
“to set forth or show; present; offer”.  Similarly, the definition of that word in the Shorter Oxford 
Dictionary includes “present, offer; hold out to be taken”.  A vendor who tendered  and 
remained ready willing and able to tender a registrable instrument of title in exchange for the 
purchase price could be said to have given the transfer within the meaning of that word in s 
                                                
96  Meridien AB Pty Ltd v Jackson [2014] 1 Qd R 142 at [35]. 
97  Meridien AB Pty Ltd v Jackson [2014] 1 Qd R 142 at [31]. 
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27(1)(b).98  The writers consider that such a meaning would fit within the range of available 
grammatical meanings and would also achieve the object of both the provision in question and 
the Act as a whole; it is a construction which was “reasonably open”.  This approach would not 
have required reliance on the Wrotham Park conditions, nor would it have involved reading in 
an exception to the clear words of the statute.  
Simmons 
A further example of an exception being read into the clear language of a statute is provided 
by the decision in Special Projects (Qld) Pty Ltd v Simmons [2012] QCA 205 (“Simmons”).  
The Queensland Court of Appeal held that a purchaser who executed a put and call option 
deed was not entitled to terminate the contract in reliance on s 9(5) of the Land Sales Act.  
The put and call option provided for an option in relation to two proposed parcels of land at 
Surfers Paradise to be created following a resumption. The purchaser successfully argued at 
first instance that each of the lots the subject of the put and call option deed was a “proposed 
allotment” within the meaning of s 6 of the Land Sales Act and that, because of 
non-compliance with the requirements of s 8, the purchaser was entitled to terminate the 
contract.  The phrase “proposed allotment” was defined in the Act to mean “a single parcel of 
land, other than a lot within the meaning of this Act, boundaries of which are shown, or to be 
shown, on a plan of survey that is to be registered under the Land Act 1994 or Land Title Act 
1994”.99  It was not in doubt that the land fell within the literal meaning of that definition.100    
Despite this, the Court of Appeal allowed the vendor’s appeal holding that the Land Sales Act 
had no application to a resumption situation.   
The Chief Justice101 reached a conclusion that the Land Sales Act had no application in a 
resumption situation (which was regulated by the Acquisition of Land Act and the terms of the 
subject contract).  His Honour said that the whole of the Act, and the central provision of s 8 in 
particular, made it “abundantly clear” that the Land Sales Act had no application in such a 
case.102  His Honour did not seek to recast the language of the provision to give effect to the 
purpose of the Act.  His Honour did not have regard to the Wrotham Park conditions. 
Fraser JA was the only member of the Court to consider the application of the Wrotham Park 
conditions.  His Honour posed the question of whether the definition of “proposed allotment” 
                                                
98  Cf Christensen S and Duncan WD, “Statutory termination rights not available to buyer in default” 
(2013) 27 APLB 182. 
99  Land Sales Act 1984 (Qld), s 6. 
100  Special Projects (Qld) Pty Ltd v Simmons [2012] QCA 205 at [23] per Fraser JA. 
101  With whom Mullins J agreed. 
102  Special Projects (Qld) Pty Ltd v Simmons [2012] QCA 205 at [20]. 
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was open to being construed as though it were “qualified by an exception” for a case in which 
the registration of the new plan of survey was required only because part of the single 
allotment the subject matter of a contract of sale had been resumed under the Acquisition of 
Land Act.103  This required a notional reading in of additional words to produce a “substantial 
departure from the literal meaning”.104  Fraser JA considered that the Wrotham Park conditions 
had been satisfied.  His Honour said the following in relation to the second and third 
conditions:105 
“The oversight was that the generality of the definition encompasses cases of the 
present kind, which were plainly not within the legislative purpose divined from the 
statute itself and the extrinsic material. If that oversight had been detected, it would 
surely have been cured by qualifying the definition by the exception I have articulated.” 
It cannot be doubted that the relevant provisions of the Land Sales Act were unsuited to 
dealing with a proposed allotment the subject of a resumption notice.  However, the put and 
call option involved the sale of land which did not then comprise a single parcel of land.  The 
contract in question provided for the sale of land which, upon settlement, would comprise a 
different lot than that which existed at the date of contract.  Was this a case in which the 
legislature had simply overlooked the eventuality that the Land Sales Act may, by its terms, 
catch cases in which land the subject of a resumption notice is contracted to be sold without 
the subdivisional requirements of that Act being satisfied? 
One of the express objects of the Act is to ensure that proposed allotments (and proposed 
lots) are “clearly identified”.  It is likely to be a rare case in which a proposed allotment could 
be clearly identified in the absence of a plan of survey for the proposed allotment.  No plan of 
survey existed at the date of the contract in Simmons.  In the writers’ respectful view, an 
argument could be made that this was a case falling within the first of the two Tokyo Mart 
categories, namely that the legislative inadvertence consisted of a failure to address the 
problem and to determine what should be done; and that to read in words creating the 
exception constituted the filling of a casus omissus in the traditional sense of that phrase. 
Conclusion 
The elasticity of the English language provides courts with an opportunity to recast seemingly 
clear language of a statutory provision to articulate an alternative meaning considered to be 
consonant with the purpose or object of the legislation.  Notwithstanding that the general 
approach to statutory interpretation in Australia has evolved to take greater account of context 
                                                
103  Special Projects (Qld) Pty Ltd v Simmons [2012] QCA 205 at [25]. 
104  Special Projects (Qld) Pty Ltd v Simmons [2012] QCA 205 at [25]. 
105 Special Projects (Qld) Pty Ltd v Simmons [2012] QCA 205 at [25]. 
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and purpose, the courts have consistently stressed that there is a dividing line that must be 
maintained between statutory interpretation and judicial legislation.  In Taylor, the majority 
reaffirmed the need for courts not to “violate the separation of powers in the Constitution”.106 
“Purposive construction often requires a sophisticated analysis to determine the 
legislative purpose and a discriminating judgment as to where the boundary of 
construction ends and legislation begins.”107 
The interpretative process or technique of reading in words raises the possibility of judicial 
legislation, particularly where to do so involves the crafting of an exception to apply to 
unambiguous language.  McHugh J, an enthusiastic proponent of the purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation, said that it is on “rare occasions” that a court may be justified in 
treating a provision as containing additional words.108  Although the majority in Taylor found it 
unnecessary to decide whether the Wrotham Park conditions are “always, or even usually, 
necessary and sufficient,” the writers consider that the Wrotham Park conditions (in a 
reformulated form) will continue to provide useful guidance for locating the dividing line 
between construction and legislation and that they can comfortably coexist with the modern 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation.  There is also no warrant for adding a fourth 
condition to a reformulated Wrotham Park test. 
The writers suggest that a five stage process (which incorporates the substance of the 
Wrotham Park conditions) may be adopted in cases where a court is invited to read words into 
a statute to give it a meaning contrary to its ordinary grammatical meaning.  This approach 
requires that the court not commence with a consideration of the Wrotham Park conditions; the 
threshold question is whether there is a construction which is reasonably open without the 
need to have recourse to such conditions.  The first two questions are as follows.  First, is the 
language of the provision reasonably open to more than one grammatical meaning having 
regard to the language of the statute and any applicable extrinsic material (and, if relevant, the 
historical context) or is it intractable/unyielding?  Secondly, if the language is reasonably open 
to more than one grammatical meaning, which meaning best achieves (or promotes) the 
legislative purpose as determined by the court?  If the language is reasonably open to more 
than one grammatical meaning, there is no need to seek to add or substitute words.   
However, if the statutory language is intractable,109 it is necessary to move to the final three 
questions to be addressed in the interpretation process (involving the Wrotham Park 
                                                
106  Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 [2014] HCA 9 at [40] per French CJ and Crennan and 
Bell. 
107  Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (No 3) (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423 per McHugh JA (as he then was). 
108  Newcastle City Council v GIO General Limited (1997) 191 CLR 85 at 113. 
109  R (Confederation of Passenger Transport UK) v Humber Bridge Board [2004] QB 310 and Director 
of Public Prosecutions v Leys (2012) 296 ALR 96; [2012] VSCA 304 are two such examples. 
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conditions).  Thirdly, having regard to the purpose of both the particular provision and the 
statute as a whole, does the application of the provision according to its intractable meaning 
result in an operation which would defeat or be inconsistent with such purpose?  Fourthly, if 
so, does the occasion to recast the provision (in an interpretative sense) result from an 
obvious drafting error (as distinct from a legislative lacuna that Parliament has overlooked as a 
matter to be addressed)?  Fifthly, if so, can the language be recast (by adding or substituting 
words) such that the substance of the recast language accords with the language Parliament 
would have adopted if its attention had been drawn to the error (and is consistent with the 
other language of the statute)?      
The fourth factor discussed above is critical to the adherence to the separation of powers; it is 
at the core of identifying legislative “inadvertence”.  On occasion, courts will be faced with 
cases in which it is evident that Parliament has failed to address, by oversight, a situation 
which should have been addressed.  In such cases, it is not for the court to overcome 
Parliament’s oversight.  To paraphrase the allusion adopted by Lord Nicholls in Inco Europe, a 
court, in discharging its interpretative function, may add words, omit words or substitute words 
only if it is plain beyond doubt that Homer, in the person of the Parliamentary drafter, has 
nodded.110 
                                                
110 See Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution (a firm) [2000] 1 WLR 586 at 589.  This is an allusive 
reference to Horace’s famous quote “Sometimes even the noble Homer nods” (Ars Poetica 1.359). 
 
